If you are a follower of this blog, dear reader, then you must have seen the utter diplomatic failure that was the February 28th Oval Office meeting between presidents Zelenskyy and Trump. For the casual observer, the moment the president of the United States started lecturing – and frankly, bullying – an ally, must have seemed like a major shift in US-International relations. Unfortunately, the era of ‘Pax Americana’ and assured US-European security partnership has been deteriorating for some time now. The catalyst? Russia’s illegal and entirely unjustified invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Moreover, the return of Donald Trump marks the beginning of the end for US-led deterrence on our continent, and 2025 will be a crucial year that determines the future of European security.

The purpose of this article is to outline the recent developments surrounding Ukraine leading up to the meeting between Zelenskyy and Trump. This includes briefly examining the current front-line situation in Ukraine, and the so-called ‘mineral deal’ which the meeting was supposed to be about. I will pay attention to the diplomatic fallout from the meeting – particularly Europe’s reaction – and the steps taken by Britain and France in response. Lastly, I will analyse what this geopolitical shift means for the future of European security and defence.

1. The war in Ukraine: how it happened and where it stands
2. Russia’s America
3. The ‘mineral deal’
4. You don’t have the cards
5. Fallout: London
6. A European union
7. Gambling with World War III

The war in Ukraine: how it happened and where it stands

The war in Ukraine began following Russia’s invasion of the Crimea peninsula in February 2014, under the pretext of protecting ethnic-Russians. This event led to further conflict between Ukrainian armed forces and separatists in the Donbas region on Ukraine’s east. In light of this, two ceasefire agreements – known as the Minsk I & Minsk II agreements – were signed in 2014 and 2015 respectively. Minsk II notably was signed between Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany and entailed Russian forces leaving Ukrainian soil in exchange for the contested Donbas regions to receive special status under the Ukrainian constitution.

Russia flagrantly violated the ceasefire when it began its full invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, with the intent of capturing the capital Kyiv and replacing President Zelenskyy with a Russian-aligned successor. The ‘special military operation’ – as it was dubbed by Russian officials – failed to meet its objectives and now as the war enters its fourth year, Ukraine is yet to be conquered. However, Russia has made substantial gains and currently occupies 20% of the country.

In Summer 2024, Ukraine launched an incursion into the Russian ‘Kursk’ region – to Ukraine’s north – where it still has a military presence. In general, neither side is making decisive advancements in either Kursk or the Donbas. It must also be noted that Russia’s economy is heavily dependent on military manufacturing, and that the end of the war would mean a disastrous economic crisis. (I recommend reading this op-ed by Leon Aron for a more detailed analysis on Russia’s war of attrition)

Russia’s America

With the return of Donald Trump to the presidency, the US begun the normalization of relations with Russia, a reversal of President Biden’s approach. President Trump held a phone call with President Putin, which he deemed ‘lengthy and highly productive’. Representatives from both states met in Saudi Arabia to discuss future US-Russia relations as well as peace in Ukraine. Notably absent from those meetings were Ukraine and Europe. This indicates a concerning disregard for European affairs, further demonstrated by Trump’s Fox News Host-turned Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth’s announcement that the US is no longer interested in European security.

Supporters of the US president argue that Trump is seeking to establish the US as a neutral mediator between Ukraine and Russia. And through this approach, find a peaceful end to the war. However, Trump’s actions since a few weeks into his presidency indicate all but neutrality. Following his phone call with Putin, he chided Zelenskyy, labeling him as dictator – a known Kremlin talking point. On the international stage, the US refused to call Russia an aggressor or an invader, and voted against a UN resolution labeling it as such.

If anything, it is apparent that Trump’s America is not seeking neutrality but blatant Russian appeasement. This is made clear by the fact that the US is demanding concessions from Ukraine – No NATO membership, and the concession of occupied lands – but are vague on what they expect from Russia in return.

The ‘mineral deal’

The US-Ukraine Mineral Agreement is largely Zelenskyy’s way of keeping the transactional Trump engaged in Ukraine’s security. The idea behind the deal is that both countries will receive co-ownership over a reconstruction investment fund derived from Ukrainian mineral mining profits. But the deal does not include any explicit security guarantees. Only relying on an implicit guarantee that the US would have an economic stake in Ukraine and therefore in its stability as well. Still, the deal could have been worse. The first iteration proposed by Trump called for Ukraine to repay the US $500 billion for its military support – and that without explicit security guarantees either.

Trump has a keen interest in securing Ukrainian rare earth minerals for the United States. This is so that the US can compete with China, which has a near monopoly on these metals which are indispensable for manufacturing. However, it is unlikely that the the mineral deal would be the solution to the US’ China problem, as the entire deal is based on an outdated Soviet geological survey – and it is not clear whether Ukraine in fact, possess the minerals it is claiming to have.

The mineral deal was set to be signed between Zelenskyy and Trump on February 28^th. It would have been the first step towards negotiating a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia. For Zelenskyy, it is important that the US is invested in maintaining the ceasefire either through having US forces in Ukraine or providing support to European forces. The main point of concern being that Russia would exploit a ceasefire to regroup and rearm itself for another offensive.

You don’t have the cards

As it happened, the mineral deal was not signed. Following Trump’s and his vice president Vance’s outburst in the Oval Office, the US leadership deemed Zelenskyy to be uninterested in peace. The point of contention began when Zelenskyy questioned the viability of diplomatic agreements with Vladimir Putin, given his blatant disregard for past ceasefire agreements. This justified criticism of Putin did not sit well with Trump and Vance. Trump himself scolded Zelenskyy for supposedly not being in a position to raise any issues, claiming “you don’t have the cards”.

The meeting was by all accounts a disaster. The United States relationship with Ukraine was severely strained, with US officials calling for Zelenskyy’s resignation. In America, the Ukrainian president was framed as a war-hawk uninterested in pursing any peaceful solutions. The reaction in Europe was a stark contrast, with almost all European leaders – with exception of the Russia-aligned Hungary and Slovakia – publicly voicing support for Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian cause.

The US President and Vice President’s conduct further reinforced that the United States’ interests are no longer aligned with Europe. In fact, the Kremlin only confirmed as much. When asked what would happen if Russia broke a potential ceasefire, Trump responded “what if anything? What if a bomb dropped on your head right now?” and declared that Putin may have betrayed presidents Bush, Obama, and Biden; but he won’t betray Trump.

Trump repeatedly stated that he would not send US forces to enforce a potential ceasefire, and that the US would not answer any NATO Article 5 call in the event European forces in Ukraine are attacked. To Trump, the mineral deal is the only solution – and one that does not require any peacekeeping force in Ukraine.

Fallout: London

Zelenskyy’s falling out with Trump made European leaders very nervous about the future of US-led security on the continent. Two days after the Oval Office meeting, an emergency security summit was held in London. Starmer, Zelenskyy, and European leaders, as well as Canada’s Prime Minister, Türkiye’s Foreign Minister, and the NATO Secretary-General met to discuss Europe’s approach. Unsurprisingly absent: the US, Hungary and Slovakia.

Key points of discussion here were the need to increase European defence spending and the possibility of assembling European forces in Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire – lest Russia ignore it as it ignored the Minsk agreements. Starmer announced the development of a ‘coalition of the willing’ who would guarantee military aid to Ukraine and protect its sovereignty. This coalition would be led by Britain and France, however most states did not make definitive commitments at the summit.

Britain, France and Ukraine trilaterally agreed to outline a ceasefire plan to present to Trump. Whatever the plan turns out to be, Europe will face major hurdles if the US does not commit to logistical military support. For one, it will be difficult to muster enough troops to patrol the 960 kilometre front-line in Ukraine. Europe could provide some ground and naval forces, but these would be spread thin. Not to mention that European armed forces cannot match the US’ rapid air force response times and intelligence gathering capabilities.

However, hopes of continued US support were all but stifled when Trump announced the suspension of more than $1 billion in military aid to Ukraine. As well as halting intelligence sharing on Russia. Supposedly, this was because the president deemed Ukraine ungrateful and unwilling to negotiate with Russia. In response, the EU announced an €800 billion defence plan to support Ukraine and arm Europe. Though, it is still in question whether that will be enough to fill the vacuum left by the US, and whether the EU can even afford such a plan. The EU still faces a €300 billion debt that it borrowed from member-states to support the European economy during the COVID-19 pandemic.

European states hold around €300 billion worth of Russian assets, that they froze following the invasion of Ukraine. Some of these assets generate income that the states used to fund loans to Ukraine. However, the seizure of the assets themselves is illegal under international law. States like Britain, France, and Germany are now discussing a possibility to seize the assets if Russia were to violate a future ceasefire deal. There is a mechanism under international law that could justify this action, but whether it is entirely applicable to the seizure of sovereign state assets is still a matter of debate.

Zelenskyy, for his part, claimed to still be interested in signing the mineral deal. However, after the Oval Office outburst, it is yet to be seen whether Trump is willing to continue negotiations as they were, or demand even more concessions in return.

A European union

The break-neck pace at which US foreign policy changed, brings into the question Europe’s historic relationship with its transatlantic ally. With the defence secretary’s comments, Trump’s rhetoric of annexing Greenland, the refusal to commit to defending NATO allies, and the clear manner in which his administration has aligned its policies with the Kremlin, demonstrates that Europe can no longer rely on Washington for security. Gone are the days of President Reagan and his strongly worded rebuke of the Soviet Union.

The diplomats are hesitant to openly criticize the Trump administration because of the key role the US plays in our defence policy. But it cannot be denied that the White House is not merely indifferent to our security, but hostile to it. This position can be summed up by the US Vice President’s ridicule of European peace plans. For all his talk of ungratefulness, Vance forgot the sacrifices made by European troops during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

At the Munich Conference last month, Ukraine claimed to have intelligence that Russia is planning a significant troop deployment to Belarus in the coming summer. “Are these Russian troops in Belarus meant to attack Ukraine? Maybe. Or maybe they’re meant for you,” warned Zelenskyy. Of course, it is in Ukraine’s interest that Europe be worried. But to dismiss threats such as these as mere fearmongering or Ukrainian politicking would be foolish. With Russia’s increasing hybrid threats against Europe, and Trump’s 180 degree shift towards Putin, it is clear Europe cannot take any chances.

Thus, it is Europe alone that will have to face Russian – or perhaps even American – aggression. The good news is that it is not impossible, but action would have to be taken fast. Britain and France are taking initiative, even discussing a nuclear umbrella to defend European states; Germany’s incoming Chancellor recognizes the threat Trump poses; Eastern European states like Poland significantly increased their defence budgets. However, other countries are lagging behind. Either because of internal political uncertainty – such in my home country of the Netherlands – or because of a naive trust in America. The bottom line is that only a unified Europe can adequately deter Russia.

Gambling with World War III

I fear, dear reader, that the severity of the threat that Russian aggression poses has not yet pierced the public consciousness in Western Europe. Leaders must face pressure from European citizens to take security action – ramp up defence spending, seek strategic autonomy, and most importantly, wake up to the new geopolitical reality: America is not a reliable ally. This would be a major adjustment for us in Western Europe. But unfortunately this is the reality that our partners on the Russian border are already experiencing.

Let me also be in clear in stating that Russia will not invade a EU member-state tomorrow. It cannot. It is facing massive equipment shortages, severe troop losses, and high inflation. That being said, a ceasefire would give Russian forces time to regroup, and unless Moscow has a plan to address the looming economic crisis, it will want to keep its wartime economy running. This could mean another offensive against Ukraine – which only reinforces the need for security guarantees – or Russia could aim elsewhere.

During the Oval Office meeting, Trump scolded Zelenskyy for “gambling with World War III”. Time will tell whether this period of uncertainty is actually a precursor to a global war, or merely a new cold war. Regardless, it is time for Europe to lay its card on the table and stand up to aggressive regimes, on either flank. To do nothing, is to gamble with World War III.