In the summer of 2011, I was an eleven-year-old boy new to the Netherlands and slowly building up my vocabulary of Dutch words. I remember learning words like ‘snoep’ (candy), ‘fiets’ (bicycle), and ‘oorlog’ (war). The last one I learned as I watched the Arab Spring in full swing on the news. In rapid pace, authoritarian states faced revolution and swift regime change. Perhaps the most notable: Syria. A civil war sparked against the Assad regime that claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands and displaced millions. Years later, on December 8, 2024, I received the notification that Damascus had finally fallen, marking the end of Assad’ rule and the beginning of a new era for Syria.

In this article, I will analyze the situation Syria’s new government finds itself in – a new president with a jihadist background, international sanctions, and security challenges. Subsequently I will outline what opportunities lie for Europe (the EU and its member-states) to help Syria rebuild. I will explain how rebuilding Syria – beside being a moral obligation towards the Syrian people – is important for European security interests. As a war-torn country, now facing a sudden shift of power, Syria is a breeding ground for terrorism. The country also faces political and security threats from Israel, Russia and Iran. If Europe can help Syria address these challenges, then the country can potentially serve as a vital security and trade partner. However, much of this will depend on how the new government chooses to govern Syria.

1. How did we get here: Bashar Al-Assad’s Fall
2. Al-Sharaa: From Jihadist to President
3. Another Afghanistan?
4. A state of sanctions
5. The inconvenient matter of terrorism
6. Threats: foreign…
7. …and domestic
8. Where do we go from here?
9. Security and Counter-terrorism
10. The Future of EU-Syria Relations

How did we get here: Bashar Al-Assad’s Fall

To establish how Syria came to be in the position it is now, we must discuss Bashar al Assad. The Duck of Damascus was never meant to rule Syria; his father groomed his older brother for power. Yet, after his brother’s death, Assad inherited what was essentially a throne. Initially seen as a potential reformer, he launched the Damascus Spring, releasing political prisoners and allowing some economic liberalization. But within a year, winter came to Damascus. Assad reverted to repression, silencing dissent and entrenching his family’s grip on power.

When the Arab Spring spread across the region, Syrians joined the call for change, sparking a brutal civil war. Various groups, including Islamist militias took control in a fragmented Syria. But Assad held power with Russian and Iranian backing. However, by 2024, shifting geopolitics – Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and Iran’s weakening influence – left him vulnerable. In December 2024, Assad was ousted by Abu-Mohammad al-Julani, now better known as Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, Syria’s new president.

Al-Sharaa: From Jihadist to President

Al-Sharaa is a controversial figure. A former Al-Qaeda operative, he rose to prominence fighting Assad’s forces, later breaking from Al-Qaeda to lead Hat’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Under his leadership, HTS ruled with strict Islamist policies – enforcing sharia law, orchestrating kidnappings and conducting suicide bombings. Yet in Idlib – a northwestern province HTS occupied since 2017 – Al-Sharaa’s rule took an unexpected turn. HTS formed the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), implementing pragmatic policies – protecting minorities and encouraging economic growth, and even building a 4G network. However, political repression remained, with critics imprisoned and dissent restricted.

When protests erupted against his rule, Al-Sharaa responded not with violence but with reforms – reducing restrictions, releasing prisoners, and establishing a formal grievance mechanism. This raises key questions: Has he truly shifted from extremism to pragmatic governance, or was this just a survival tactic to consolidate power? Now, as president, his greatest test is proving that his reforms are real – not just a strategy to gain international legitimacy.

Another Afghanistan?

Governments are cautious towards Al-Sharaa’s transitional government. Indeed, the new president echoes his policies in Idlib more so than his jihadist past. For example, HTS officials voiced inclusiveness toward Syrian minorities, including Christians, and has not strictly enforced restrictive Islamic norms on women. However, events like the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 are still fresh in the minds of leaders and their diplomats. When the fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was all but inevitable following the United States’ withdrawal, the Taliban assured the world that it would be committed to civil liberties, particularly with regards to the rights of women to work, study and participate in Afghani society.

Four years later, and the state of women’s rights in the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ has denigrated to the point where women are prohibited from speaking in public. States are concerned whether Al-Sharaa – who the Taliban praised and expressed hope to have ‘brotherly relations’ with – is truly committed to reform and civil liberties or merely using his reformist rhetoric as a smokescreen. Especially as some reports already indicate gender segregation in Damascus’ public transportation, or changes to the education system such as removing evolution from the curriculum.

Nevertheless, we must also appreciate the complexity of Syria’s situation. Not only did Al-Sharaa inherit a comfortable presidential palace, but he inherited the crippling international sanctions against the Assad regime as well.

A state of sanctions

Syria faced Western economic sanctions since the start of the civil war. Imposed by the United States, Canada and the European Union, they were a response to Assad’s repression of Syrians. The EU’s sanctions regime was extended last year and intended to be reviewed in the summer of 2025. Restrictions included an arms embargo, export bans on communication equipment and technology, a ban on all imports of Syrian oil, and restrictions on financial support for trade. After the fall of the Assad regime, six European countries called for the EU to ease its sanctions on Syria, proposing to rescind the ban on oil and gas exports. Fortunately, the EU lifted restrictions on Syrian energy sectors.

The EU itself, while cautious as everyone else, was not immediately dismissive of Al-Sharaa’s government. The EU Commissioner for Crisis Management Hadja Lahbib met president Al-Sharaa in Damascus, and the president was further invited to Paris by French president Emmanuel Macron. There is a clear willingness in Europe to engage with Al-Sharaa’s government, but as Kaja Kallas – the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy – emphasized, the easing of sanctions will ultimately hinge on Al-Sharaa’s approach to inclusiveness and radicalization.

Easing sanctions is necessary to address the crisis Syria is in. The country’s cities stand in ruins and six million Syrians find themselves displaced, hungry and unemployed. This situation presents a serious security risk by creating a potential vacuum for terrorists to exploit. Yet, even with Europe willing to ease sanctions, one major legal roadblock remains: HTS, now the Syrian government, is still designated as a terrorist organization by the EU, US, and UN because of its past ties to Al-Qaeda.

The inconvenient matter of terrorism

HTS’  terrorist designation substantially limits international aid organizations from cooperating with the new government. With the Syrian population in a dire state, expanded access to aid is an urgent matter. Fortunately, there is an international interest to drop the designation. The US and the EU have their own procedures for de-listing terrorist groups and can generally do so unilaterally. Naturally, this would be contingent on specific conditions and guarantees.

But, removing HTS from the UN’s terrorist sanctions list is more complicated. In all likelihood the matter will come before the UN Security Council. Russia – one of five permanent Security Council members with a veto – already raised concerns about Al-Sharaa’s jihadist past. Al-Sharaa for his part, proposed the creation of independent civilian bodies that works alongside the government, instead of under it. It is not immediately clear whether these civilian bodies could legally serve as proxies for international aid organizations, but such a plan could extend Syrians’ access to the aid they urgently need, without violating international sanctions. But navigating around sanctions is one thing, while Al-Sharaa must also navigate around internal and external threats.

Threats: foreign…

Any change of status quo is bound to ruffle feathers. In the case of Syria, Russia and Iran lost an indispensable ally in Assad. The vacuum Assad left behind, was quickly taken advantage of by Israel who expanded its occupation the Golan Heights and neutralized Syria’s air defense and naval capabilities. Within Syria itself, ISIS finds an ideal environment to grow.

Russia is keen on maintaining its military presence in the region. Particularly, the Tartus Naval base on the Mediterranean Coast and the Khmeimim Air Base near to the port city of Latakia. These bases are strategically important for Russian interests in the Middle East, and also serve as launching pads for its operations in Africa. Moreover, these bases are among Russia’s few access points to warm water ports. So far, dialogue between HTS and Russia are ongoing. It is unclear what will come of these negotiations, but recent reports indicate a withdrawal of Russian military equipment.

Given its war of aggression in Ukraine and open hostility to the West, it must go without saying that Russian military presence in Syria is unacceptable. Syria hosts substantial energy resources, which can be utilized with foreign investment. Europe desperately needs such an opportunity given that it can no longer rely on Russian energy exports. A Russian military presence in Syria, especially to the extent it had would serve as a constant and significant threat to any Syrian European trade partnership. Russia could jeopardize trade either through direct military action or through hybrid threats.

Iran was a staunch supporter of the Assad regime and for good reason. Syria served as a land bridge through which Iran established supply lines to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The maintenance of Hezbollah as a formidable force in southern Lebanon was Iran’s deterrent against its mortal enemy Israel. After Israel substantially weakened Hezbollah late last year, it is more so important for Iran to maintain the supply line. Given their support of Assad, Al-Sharaa does not hold Iran to high regard. But Israel’s illegal occupation of the Golan Heights and subsequent bombing of Syria’s defense systems, gives Tehran an opening to bring Al-Sharaa under its sphere of influence.

Israel’s actions of late are concerning. Besides the War in Gaza being a major motivator of terrorism, the Golan Heights threatens to spark a conflict in a country already exhausted by war. At present, Syria is not capable of waging full-scale war against Israel, but any hostility can alienate the country away from the West. As a close ally of Israel, Europe must facilitate dialogue between Damascus and Tel Aviv to prevent hostilities – and most importantly, deprive Iran of any strategic opportunities in Syria.

A matter deserving of its own article is Rojova. As Syria’s Kurdish-held region, it is central to the country’s economic future, as it holds most of Syria’s energy resources. However, it remains a geopolitical flashpoint—Türkiye, HTS’ ally, opposes its autonomy, while the US provides military support to the Kurdish. Al-Sharaa must navigate these competing interests while finding a way to integrate the Kurds into Syria’s government.

…and domestic

Another issue that Al-Sharaa will have to face, is an organization which is in resurgence: ISIS. Assad’s prisons held people indiscriminately, and while innocents have been released since the regime’s fall, so have terrorists. ISIS may be preparing to reestablish an Islamic State the likes of which the world has not seen since a decade earlier. On January 1^st 2025, an individual tied to ISIS committed an attack in New Orleans, and earlier in September 2024, a man motivated by ISIS propaganda committed a knife attack in Rotterdam. It is of strategic importance to Europe that Syria’s armed forces are sufficiently organized to combat ISIS before the organization achieves the capability of conducting large-scale attacks against the West. With continued operations in Africa and Afghanistan, the threat of an ISIS comeback is only growing.

And thus, the question now remains of what substantial policy decisions Europe should employ to shape its future relations with Syria?

Where do we go from here?

For Europe, Syria means two things. Firstly, Syria at its present state is a risk to European security through terrorism and foreign interests. The interests of our enemies Russia and Iran threaten not only our security but also of our ally Israel. And secondly, Syria can be a vital trading partner thanks to its potential oil and gas exports. Presently, the EU will have to employ a mix of diplomacy, trade, and security to build a foundation for future relations with Syria. All three hinge on the other and are mutually beneficial for both parties.

As mentioned, the EU can play an important role in facilitating diplomatic dialogue between Israel and Syria to prevent the outbreak of hostilities and exacerbating an already untenable refugee crisis. I imagine any negotiations regarding Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights would have to entail guarantees that Syrian territory can never be used by Iran or others to threaten Israeli security.

In terms of trade, easing sanctions can integrate Syria into the global energy market. Trading with major Western nations would bring substantial investment into the Syrian economy and put the country on the path of reconstruction. However, a viable energy partnership will ultimately depend on the fate of Rojova. Here, Europe will need to formulate a clearer stance towards Kurdish independence. The issue is contentious especially considering the role Türkiye and Iraq play in maintaining the flow of migration. In any case, Syria cannot become a significant oil supplier without the Kurdish regions.

Security and Counter-terrorism

If Al-Sharaa’s government can prove a legitimate shift from radicalism, then both parties can cooperate on security issues. Europe could engage in intelligence sharing, military training and armament to build up the Syrian Armed Forces. So that it can be a formidable force against internal terrorist threats such as ISIS. However, to what extent Syria can stand against external actors, will likely be limited as such a prospect would be unacceptable to Israel. Regardless, Europe would have to employ an approach that balances the sovereignty and security of both states.

Aiding Syria in this crucial stage, would also make it more willing to consider Europe’s interests when interacting with Russia and Iran. A Russian military presence must be a non-starter, and Europe can – and should – leverage its diplomatic, economic and security assistance on that. With regards to Iran, other states opposed to the terrorist regime in Tehran, such as Saudi Arabia are already engaging with Syria to invest in the country and help rebuild. It can do Europe no harm by engaging similarly. As Iran has proven itself to be not just an enemy of Israel, but also diametrically opposed to Western fundamental values.

The Future of EU-Syria Relations

It must be emphasized, however, that any cooperation between Europe and Syria is contingent on the latter absolutely denouncing Islamic extremism, and fostering an inclusive and just society for all Syrians regardless of religion or ethnic background. Europe has adopted the approach of easing sanctions in a manner which provide a fail-safe to immediately reapply restrictions if Al-Sharaa demonstrates jihadist policies. It would also serve Europe’s security interests to reimpose sanctions if the Syrian government aligns itself with any terrorist or anti-Western regimes.

Ultimately, Syria is an opportunity for Europe to gain a strategic ally in the Middle East. One that could combat terrorist threats, while also serving as a vital trading partner. European investment can help revitalize a once beautiful country and assist Syrians in rebuilding their nation.

Of course, an ally in Syria will not solve all of Europe’s security challenges alone and Al-Sharaa will still have a long way to go before Europe is fully convinced that his government is committed to moderation and cooperation with the West. The matter of Rojova and the Golan Heights will be make-or-break events, and already some neighboring states like Egypt have raised concerns about HTS’ preferential treatment of foreign jihadists. Regardless, European disengagement is not an option. If Europe fails to act, Damascus risks falling into authoritarianism or foreign influence, threatening regional stability. A calculated, conditional engagement with Syria – one focused on security, trade, and diplomacy, could turn a fragile state into a strategic partner. That is a chance worth taking.